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Nondual Community: The Flowering of Intersubjectivity (Part 3)

Posted on Jun 3rd, 2007 by Balder : Kosmonaut Balder

ONE by Alex Grey


"This is the divine life in Wholeness: realization as Absolute, formless Person-Community, the effusion of Love; and realization as relative, formed Cosmos-Community, the unceasing Birth in Beauty."  ~ Beatrice Bruteau


If there is any place for myth in a postmetaphysical worldview - for a story that inspires and informs, that accounts for our being and evokes a powerful vision of our becoming - I believe that Beatrice Bruteau offers a compelling one in her essay, The Many and the One: Communitarian Nondualism.  In particular, I believe the story she tells, while quite compatible with Integral Theory, is also one which can inform the vision of interbeing and collective awakening we have been telling here in this recent series of blogs.


In this concluding essay in my "Nondual Community" series, I want to outline some of Bruteau's ideas as they relate to the topic we have discussing.  But for a fuller view of her vision, I refer you to the book in which her essay appears:  The Other Half of My Soul.  The book celebrates the life of Bede Griffiths and explores the interface of Hindu and Christian contemplative spirituality.  The essay appears in the section entitled, "Spirituality of the Future: Experiencing Wholeness."  I think this is significant, because what we are exploring here is in some sense new.  Not that there has been no intuition of intersubjectivity before; not that people have not practiced and awakened together in the past.  Rather, I believe what we are witnessing is simply a new phase in an ancient dance: the ecstatic spiraling movements of Eros and Agape in Time.

BBruteau

Beatrice Bruteau is an attractive and compelling figure for me.  She is one of those rare religious scholars: a contemplative as well as an intellectual.  She has written several excellent works on Teilhard de Chardin and Sri Aurobindo, she edited the book on Bede Griffiths I cited above, and she has been active in articulating her own vision of an evolutionary spirituality and ecological ethics which integrates the best of ancient contemplative and modern scientific perspectives.  In the essay which I will discuss here, she draws on mythical Trinitarian language to formulate a perspective which accounts for the mystical intuition of oneness without eviscerating the unique gifts of multiplicity and mutuality.


Person and Nature


Why is it, Bruteau asks, that mystics, upon realizing oneness with the Absolute and the Kosmos, so often then devote themselves to the service of others, instead of retreating into solipsistic apathy?  What is it about the unity experience that heightens the preciousness of the many? If we are all one, why do we also appear to experience awakening uniquely and individually?  What kind of oneness is this?


To answer these questions, Bruteau asks us to explore the dynamics of our person-perspectives.  She does this apparently independently of Wilber's work in this area, though her conclusions are consonant with it in many respects.  If we look at ourselves and each other from the outside (either taking a third-person or even a second-person perspective), we find that we are defined by our mutual negation: you are different from me by having certain qualities, certain space-time attributes, that I lack, and vice-versa.  I am not-you; you are not-me.  But if we look at ourselves and the world from the inside, in the immediacy of our subjectivity, we do not find objects which can be distinguished or differentiated; we find a dynamic, nonlocal presence, a living activity.  This presence, she argues, when experienced "from the inside," lacks specific attributes and cannot be differentiated from other "things," because it itself is not a thing.  It is empty.


Noting this, she asks an intriguing question:  "Could our act of being, of living in real time, experiencing ourselves from the inside, be an act of affirming another?"  If we experience non-difference from other sentient beings, because we are no longer identifying with the manifold qualities which have defined us, do we collapse then into oneness without distinctions?  Or do we enter into a deeper form of relationship with others - a perichoretic dynamic of mutual affirmation and kenotic agape?


This is a subtle topic, and it is difficult in this short space to do it justice.  In simple terms, Bruteau acknowledges the Eastern definition of awakening as impersonal, but attempts to push past it with a unique definition of personhood.  When we experience awakening, we may regard it at first as impersonal, because all of the objective attributes we identify with our personality, our personal being, are revealed as contingent, as not-me.  The person, in that sense, drops away.  In its place is an open clearing of dynamic, unqualifiable, creative presence.  But in Bruteau's view, it is this open presence itself that is the "person" - not as a fixed metaphysical entity like the atman or soul (that is another abstraction, a metaphysical construct), but simply as the self-affirming fact of subjective immediacy, a presencing which cannot be reduced either to a monolithic "oneness" nor a fractured "many."


To unpack this notion, Bruteau draws on the work of philosopher Daniel Walsh.  From this perspective, person must be differentiated from nature.  The nature is the individual creature, the sentient being known from outside, from third-person perspectives:  the contingent self.  It is defined by its unique attributes and exists in relationships of mutual negation with other beings.  The person, on the other hand, is formless and undefined.  According to Bruteau, summarizing Walsh's position, "it is transcendental and coextensive with being.  It is not capable of collapse, but is embedded in Absolute Being itself..."  Because it is transcendental, it does not exist in subject-object relationship with other persons; rather, the nature of persons is communion, compenetration, circuminsessional union.


These claims may strike readers as empty theologizing or metaphysical card-stacking.  But Bruteau stresses that they are an attempt to argue from relatively universal patterns in our experience, and they sacrifice conceptual or rational "neatness" in favor of honoring as many dimensions of our experience as possible.


If you are interested in the full scope of Bruteau's argument, I recommend reading her essay, but I will summarize some key points here, before moving on to the second section of this entry.


  • Natures are contingent and defined by mutual negation
  • Persons are transcendental and exist in communion and mutual affirmation.
  • Persons are always unique and are not reducible to a monolithic single entity, as natures are always multiple.
  • Being is a flowing, dynamic whole, and persons are inseparable from this flowing (indeterminate, infinite) wholeness; while "natures" and "things" are always frozen slices, abstractions, third-person snapshots of the whole's boundless, creative dynamism.
  • The cosmos is evolving, and is composed of sentient occasions (in Whitehead's sense) or sentient beings (in Wilber's sense), which unfold in greater complexity and expansiveness of mutual embrace.
  • The absolute, as the depth dimension of being (not a separately existing thing), may be conceived of as a formless person-community; while the universe of form may be considered a cosmos-community.  The absolute person-community and the relative cosmos-community are nondual, and the radical (objective) interdependence of contingent forms mirrors the deep (subjective/perichoretic) co-determination of transcendent persons.
  • Natures or contingent beings have "choice freedom," whereas transcendent persons have "creative freedom" and in fact are characterized by this spontaneity and authenticity.
  • Persons are instantiations of love, and personhood reaches fruition as we deepen in kenotic agape: self-emptying love. 


There is much that could be said about this consciously woven myth, this story of the creative play of the person-community in and through and as the cosmos, but I will devote the remainder of this essay to the final point in my list above.  Because the nature of personhood can really only be grasped and fully appreciated when we understand the meaning of kenosis.


mysticrose


I-I, The Circle of Love, and the Mystical Rose


"To truly empathize is to enter into the deep self of the other ... such that he, she, or it arises as a self within one's own place of appearance."  ~ Robert E. Carter


Wilber argues that the Kosmos is composed of sentient beings, of perspective-occasions arising in AQAL space.  And he tells a story of the involution of Spirit and the evolution of the Kosmos, a creative play driven by Eros and pulled by Agape.  If, in our postmetaphysical world, we are willing to entertain this story as a useful fiction - a way of visualizing the mystery in which we are all involved - then we may also be willing to entertain a parallel story, on similar grounds.  We may not take it literally, and yet we also need not strip it of its creative power. 


This parallel story is the story Bruteau tells of Absolute Love:  "God is Love, Absolute Reality is Love.  But Love is Persons, and persons are lovers.  Because loving is the way it is, persons have to be the way they are - that is, both multiple and united."  Agape, Bruteau tells us (drawing on the rich symbolism of Christian myth), is ecstatic self-emptying - the emptying of persons into each other, for each other.  It is the will to give one's self wholly to the other, to unite with the beloved in ecstasy.  We cannot differentiate persons, because they are not contingent and do not have natures, and yet we affirm each other through kenotic agape.


In this vision, the cosmos-community is seen as the child of the self-emptying love of the formless person-community: as the Persons of the mythical Trinity exhibit kenotic agape in their own co-inherence and communion, so the unfolding of the world of form is the externalization of this dynamic interiority, which then slowly evolves towards the fullness of conscious self-emptying love.  As Bruteau writes:  "[T]he phenomenal beings of the Cosmic Community, expressing the interrelated energies of their external beings, eventually develop an interiority that becomes sufficiently intense as interiority to recognize itself as Person Community."


She describes the evolution of this movement in terms of person-perspectives.  As humans, we may relate to each other from third-person, second-person, or first-person perspectives.  In the third-person view, we relate to others as objects, as either absent or devoid of presence.  There is little to no intersubjective resonance.  But we may also relate to others as second persons, and this is the beginning of the emergence of the "person world."  Bruteau describes this as a shift from about to to:  we speak to the other, meet their gaze, engage their presence.  When we recognize others as living subjects, we will try to empathize with them, Bruteau says, but at first we often do so in the third-person: putting ourselves in another's place in our imaginations, as if they were not there.  We think about their feelings.  But then we may move closer, opening ourselves to them further - to the mystery that they are, and that we are together.  We enter into dialogue.  As this deepens, we may then open the door from an I-Thou to an I-I relation: 


The more we devote personal intentional energies toward the other, the more power of being we seem to have and the more we experience ourselves as persons in the Walshian sense - as transcending our natures and the favorable or unfavorable circumstances that affect those natures... This leads to my practicing of sympathy with the other actually present, to trying to feel the other's feelings directly, not merely feeling a parallel to them devised from my own experiences.  I am now trying to enter directly into the other's subjective presence, not to confront it by looking into the other's eyes, but to flow together with it, to join its own dynamic, by looking out though the other's eyes.  I no longer address her or him as "you," but instead join my "I" to his "I".


But on the other hand, as I have progressed in this practice and come to experience myself as a transcendent person, so I must know the other is also a transcendent person.  The scaffolding, so to speak, of our relationship - by means of interest in the advantageous circumstances first of my life and then of her or his life - falls away.  That person is no more dependent on circumstances than I am myself.  Her or his interior being is as indescribable as my own, equally transcendent nature.  Not being a nature, she or he cannot be an object for me as subject.  There is nothing that can be conceived or known.  Just as I cannot know myself but only be myself, so I cannot know another person but only existentially join that one's actuality.  This is not a deprivation of knowledge; on the contrary, knowing itself is merely an impoverished substitute for being.  But this "being" is conscious, self-luminous, an "I".


In this "I-I" relation, there is no exclusion.  First, the persons do not desire to exclude anything about themselves from each other.  They try to open themselves up to each other, try to enter into each other's inner self.  Second, since they are persons, there are no properties, attributes, or other possessions for them to sequester.  They cannot be defined and cannot be "different" from one another.  They are their existential actuality as persons, whose characteristic dynamic is this devotion of positive intentional energy to other persons.


Persons are given from their origin in Ultimate Reality, God/Love, as necessarily plural, as many.  Each person is a unique source of agape, authenticity, and actuality.  And yet they are one.  And yet therefore they are one; for the whole intent of this relation is to coincide with - to flow together with - the other until there is nothing about either that is not present in both.

I quoted Bruteau at length here because this passage neatly, and profoundly, captures the essence of what she means by person-community (as an expression of kenotic agape).  It is the co-inherence of I-to-I, neither many nor one.  She argues that the "attractor" of the cosmos is towards community, that the dynamic thrust of evolution is toward the emergence of fuller and fuller person-communities - communitarian nondualism.  


She uses a number of metaphors to describe this.  One is the circle of love.  The dynamic of kenotic agape is not fulfilled when there are only one or two persons: at least three are required for the full self-giving that allows personhood to emerge in its fullness.  Because a binary relationship is still locked in self-fulfillment, in mutual reward; it needs yet to be pierced by a third to allow for full self-emptying (and self-emergence).  The circle-being is thus the perichoresis of Trinity.


She also uses the metaphor of the mystical rose.  At the outer edges of the rose, she says, we find distinct petals - individual persons.  But as you go towards the center, these petals begin to overlap each other, until at the center they fully coincide.  The rose is thus the blooming of the person-community out of undivided wholeness.


These images, and her whole model, in fact, are in one sense just portraits in the sky.  Light shows for us to enjoy.  But they have a dynamic quality which I believe can call us towards deeper ways of being together, and a greater appreciation for the mystery we all live which is neither one nor many, and in which the self is found only when it is given away.


Access_public Access: Public 44 Comments Print views (2,375)  
jikishin : composer
about 2 hours later
jikishin said

-a fine series of essays, Balder!

This distinguishing between, or recognizing the difference in, “nature” and “person”, I find extreamly valuable in my own sense of who, what and how we are.

This entry clarifies the previous one further, for me, in that “the public self” is not merely confined to (Walsh's) nature, or Mortimer Adler's “person as a locus of rights”, but can include ( as Fred Kaufman spoke of at an ISC event) the person as a locus of response-ability, a prime enacter of kenotic agape.

The nature/person distinction lept out to me as familiar having posted a similar discernment on a Multiplex thread (The Very Next Word, by Davidd). In that post “highest self” seems equal to Bruteau's person …”inseperable from this flowing wholeness”. In your summary, Bruteau's point, “transcendent persons have 'creative freedom' and in fact are charecterized by spontineity and authenticity ” also resonates with the instance of that old post. As soon as David's request entered my awareness I “knew” immediatly, and responded without hesitation.

Just as the content and context, the subject matter and experiential vessel, coincided beautifully in that instance, it seems to me that nature and person do both evolve interdependently, and that any binary, dual, polar framing of their irreducably rich dynamism will always fall short of accurate, immediate, direct living of them.

Thanks again Balder for this creative sharing of self/other,

jikishin

Nicole : wakingdreamer
about 9 hours later
Nicole said

balder, this is breath-taking in its scope and depth. thank you so very much for directing me here (via the integral christianity pod)!

Balder : Kosmonaut
about 20 hours later
Balder said

Thanks, Kerry.  I am glad you made the connection between person and public self.  I had been thinking that I needed to add a concluding piece, to sort of summarize the connections I see between the three parts of this essay.  (I stopped where I did on this one simply because it was getting long for a blog entry.)  One thread I see running through several of the recent essays (including in the “Deep Dialogue” series) is a distinction between thinking and thought, between the abstracted self and dynamic open presence, between the private self and the presentation of knowingness by time (which casts up self and other as it bubbles forth).  Bohm and TSK both emphasize “thinking the whole” – dropping into the dynamic activity of thinking, as contrasted with either “samsaric” involvement in the mechanical reactivity of thought or the Ascender's move to deny and suppress thinking altogether.  Bruteau does not suggest any practices in her essay, but she identifies person with the same ungraspable, dynamic clarity, and describes the discovery of this authentic presence as one's “nature” drops away.

In the Steve McCarl essay I mentioned in my previous entry on TSK, he uses another term that is useful: he calls this open clearing the “transparent I.”  For instance, check out this passage from McCarl's essay.  I think you'll see how close it is in many regards to what Bruteau is also saying:

“The TSK vision provides an alternative that relates back to the process of thinking rather than the content of thoughts. The focus is on the arising or sheer presence of phenomena rather than on the phenomena as content. In this view, the self becomes the space or place where knowledge appears, and knowledge becomes the arising of content rather than solely the content itself. As the agent of this knowledge, the self does not so much possess knowledge as express knowing. When knowledge is not what the knower knows, the knower becomes an instant of knowledge occurring, rather than one who knows such and such content. The continuous flow of ongoing knowing is aborted when knowing identifies with content. In Oakeshottian terms, the self is a maker of the world of images within which it exists, but upon identifying itself with images within one set of images (e.g., practical, scientific, poetic) it loses its power to make and appreciate images on an infinite scale. It thereby loses touch with the whole of reality; it becomes estranged, closed down, and narrow. It is a lover neither of knowledge nor the conversation of mankind. The TSK vision cultivates a knowingness by which the individual can avoid the narrowness of the self and the correspondingly restricted public that it brings along.

“The distinction between thinking and identification with the content of thinking emerges more clearly if we investigate the role of the self as the author of a narrative account. Suppose that I tell the story of my life and then am asked to say who I am. If I refer exclusively to the content of the story to identify myself, I am missing the “I” that is the  author (the source of the content). As author the I is transparent, in the sense that nothing identifiable (having content) is the authorial or transparent I. This transparent I, the source of the thinking from which content comes, transcends the content of any and every story.
The self is not very open to the arising of new content, for in order to protect itself, the I that insists on its identity must repress, deny, or avoid content incompatible with its identity. This move displaces the transparent I. The transparent I cannot be distinguished in terms of content; it is doing the distinguishing. To acknowledge this is difficult for the self. As a position or unique bit of consciousness the self is inseparable from specific content. It is likely to find the experience of being indistinguishable at once threatening and incomprehensible.

“The presence of bits of consciousness that are distinct from one another-content in other words-is a given, but that content is not the transparent I. One might think of content as the footprints of the transparent I, evidence that the transparent I leaves behind. The transparent I cannot be reduced to this content, and precisely for this reason it always allows for the possibility of new content. As transcendent source it remains transparent, necessarily beyond all content…” (Steve McCarl, TSK and the Public).

Best wishes,

B.

jikishin : composer
about 21 hours later
jikishin said

And McCarl on content and the transparent I, for me, echoes Tim's finishing flurry of qualifications that he topped off his blogopalooza piece with.

jiki

jikishin : composer
about 22 hours later
jikishin said

Hi B.,

Driving today, reflecting on your entry, a line of thought began. This had to do with wondering how we may be further establishing the kosmic grooves of quadrantial factors which may be potentiating, compounding the probaility of realizing, Communitarian Nondualism.


You wrote, “In this vision, the cosmos-community is seen as the child of the self-emptying love of the formless person-community. … ” , “… the unfolding of the world of form is the exterialization of this dynamic interiority.”


This “externalization” I began to relate to our use of what I once called ” the hardwares for the materialization of memory”, in which I included writen language, representational art, and recording technologies in general.


Another strand of this line was something George Leonard noted in his book, Transfomations. How there may be a unifying influence of concurrent, global experience of media.( He was writing of a release of a Beatles albumn, and the mass anticipation gratified with ready availability and participation in the grand, decentralized audience.)

Could this aspect of recent histiry, the snowballing of our capabilities to materialize memory and share exact patternings of perception, be contributing significantly to the realization of nondual community?

What of the pulse of litugical engagements? With more people attending religious services than sporting events..  How might these habits of communing (simply the convening regardless of content ) be carving the grooves of person-community, the apriori source, into the cosmos-community of nature, human rights, and sustainable resouce use?

-thoughts on thoughts,

jiki

theurj : Wyrdo
1 day later
theurj said

You said of Bruteau:

“The person, in that sense, drops away.  In its place is an open clearing of dynamic, unqualifiable, creative presence.  But in Bruteau's view, it is this open presence itself that is the “person” - not as a fixed metaphysical entity like the atman or soul (that is another abstraction, a metaphysical construct), but simply as the self-affirming fact of subjective immediacy, a presencing which cannot be reduced either to a monolithic 'oneness' nor a fractured 'many.'”

I'd like contextualize this with your previous posts regarding Habermas, de Quincey and Mead. Bruteau's notion, along with Wilber's and de Quincey's (and yours), is that at root of intersubjectivity is this transcendent “spirit.” Or in the terms above, a “subjective immediacy” or 1st-person account. But I think Habermas' point (via Mead) is that there is no 1st person without being created from the outside via the 2nd person. In other words, the 1st person doesn't tecnically even exist before that socialization process.

Now yes, there is an “awareness” within a human being before it develops this 1st- person “self” via this 2nd-person socialization process. But before that there is no “I,” just diffuse, oceanic embeddeness. In other words, the “pre” of the pre-trans fallacy. So in a sense this positing of a transcendent self as originary in “subjective immediacy” is a sort of pre-trans fallacy because it suggest that this “subjective” immediacy, this “self,” was there to begin with and it was not. And certainly the Self (big S) was not.

Now once we attain an “I” through a “you” then we can begin to go trans I and you, in this I-I space Bruteau (and de Quincey and Wilber) speaks of. But I don't think it's accurate to speak of it as “subjective immediacy,” as that concept itself arises with the metaphyical philosophy of consciousness that Habermas and Wilber have so aptly criticized. Granted Bruteau attempts the same with her languaging of this “state” as an “open clearing of dynamic, unqualifiable, creative presence.” And I'd have to agree with that, except in the aspect of “presence,” the latter of which IS a metaphysical contstruct, as is “immediate experience.”

Now there is quite a bit of debate on that last statement between the cosmological and the poststructural postmodern camps, with Whitehead and Derrida as the titular representatives. I'm exploring this very topic right now at Open Integral (www.openintegral.net). I do not have the answer, just a lot of questions at this point, and I'm exploring a book there on how boths camps might find some rapprochement on such subtle and significant issues.

But some tentative conclusions that are emerging for me at this point from that reading (and related sources) is that 1) Wilber's characterization of Derrida, deconstruction is way off-target due to his 2) siding with the cosmological (or what he and they term “reconstructive” postmodernism) when 3) the editors of the book (and others) think that it is not an either/or choice (how 1st tier!) between them but their “integration,” so to speak, using postformal thinking wherein lies the next generation of “integral.”

theurj : Wyrdo
1 day later
theurj said

As Wilber said in Integral Spirituality (draft) regarding the myth of the given, pp. 207-8:
 

the belief that the consciousness of an individual will deliver truth. This is why

Habermas calls the myth of the given by the phrase “the philosophy of consciousness”-

and that is what he is criticizing because it is blind to intersubjectivity, among other

things. As we have been saying throughout this book, consciousness itself simply cannot

see zones #2 and #4, and therefore is deficient in and of itself (e.g., “Not through

introspection but through history do we come to know ourselves”). You can introspect

all you want and you won't see those other truths. So consciousness itself is deficient-

whether personal or transpersonal, whether pure or not pure, essential or relative, high or

low, big mind or small mind, vipassana, bare attention, centering prayer, contemplative

awareness-none of them can see these other truths, and that is why Habermas and the

postmodernists extensively criticize “the philosophy of consciousness.”

Balder : Kosmonaut
1 day later
Balder said

Hi, Edward,


You are making some important points.  Although I'm not certain about this, I do not believe de Quincey is in the same boat as Wilber and Bruteau with regards to the question of the existence of a transcendent Spirit.  De Quincey simply suggests that matter always “tingles with feeling and awareness,” at all levels; he doesn't go farther than this, that I can recall.  But even though Bruteau and Wilber use the term “spirit,” this is complicated, because they are not using it in conventional ways.  Bruteau's perspective may still be more invested in metaphysics than Wilber's, but I'm not positive about that; I'll need to read longer, more detailed works by her to say for sure.


I agree with Habermas and Mead (and Wilber) that what we identify as first-person “subjectivity” emerges in the context of second- and third-person perspectives – through socialization, and through the evolutionary movement of meaning-making (a la Kegan).  Part of the confusion here, perhaps, is that I've been using subjectivity to refer to de Quincey's subjectivity-1; whereas Mead and Habermas appear to address subjectivity-2.  Subjectivity-1 still can be seen as a metaphysical construct (I believe Wilber would point out it is still a perspective), but it differs from subjectivity-2 in that it points to the fact that there is awareness or experience at all, rather than to the sense of being a subject among objects and “others.”


Personally, I believe that something like subjectivity-1 does have to be accepted as a universal given (rather than an evolutionarily emergent product of material processes), or we end up with what I believe is the intractible “hard problem” of consciousness.  But I agree with you that we are entering more deeply into metaphysical investment if we move from here to positing the pre-givenness of persons.  (My question is, is there still creative value in making this metaphysical move?)


Daniel Walsh, on whom Bruteau relies for her model, argues that persons are subsistent relations (not contingent entities) in and of Spirit or the Absolute.  But Bruteau, in her own vision, does not appear to be suggesting that the person that emerges when nature “drops away” has been there all along, immune from development or evolution.  She clearly states that the emergence of the person-community in the cosmos is an evolutionary process.


I agree with you also that “immediate experience” is probably not the best term to use, in that it may hide the fact that what is given in experience is neither self-existent nor “innocently disclosed” to consciousness, without any mediation.  But when I use the term, I am not referring to the content of experience, or assuming that what appears in and as any particular experience is pre-given.  I am referring more to (awareness of) the ongoing act of experiencing, which is an AQAL affair.


I think Habermas' critique of the “philosophy of consciousness” is valid, as I understand it, but I do not think it actually refutes or invalidates contemplative practices or phenomenological approaches.  Rather, as I think Wilber suggests, it should be taken as a reminder not to rely exclusively on these methodologies; in themselves, they are not sufficient.  The phrase, “Not through introspection but through history do we come to know ourselves,” in itself, is also incomplete, and just as lopsided as the view the intersubjectivists are critiquing.  It also has to be contextualized, which I think is one thing the Integral project attempts to do.


The TSK vision steers clearer of the sorts of metaphysical constructs that appear to inform at least parts of Bruteau's model, but I still think Bruteau is offering a perspective which has its own creative/enactive merits.  Perhaps her view can be refined to take account more explicitly of the various critiques the intersubjectivists raise.  (One resource for this would be Raimundo Panikkar, who also explores Christian notions like personhood and perichoresis from a perspective equally informed by Buddhist philosophy and postmodern critical theory).  But that's more than I can do here at the moment …


At the least, I think a postmetaphysical approach would be to recognize that the perspectives that are available to the “person” or “transparent I” are not primordially present, waiting to be unearthed once we drop our identification with (Walshian) nature, but rather are themselves a high order development.


Best wishes,


Balder

theurj : Wyrdo
1 day later
theurj said

Yes, I'd agree with your last statement that even this “transparent I” is not primordially present but emerges in development. What does seem to be primordially present though is “awareness.” We are aware from the start but not aware of “I.” But even using a word like “transparent” for it, and the notion that the “I” is “transcendent,” is postmetaphysically problematic. It seems to me that the “I” in a 1st-person reflexivity that emerges via the processes elaborated by Habermas et al. Interpreting it as “trans”personal or transcendent seems to arise from the perennial traditions upon exploring this self-reflexivness without yet having the benefit of the poststructurualist perspective. Hence Ken's PM critique of the myth of the given which includes even a “transcendent” consciousness per above. It might be that the very nature of the I's reflexiveness is due to its inherent mirror-like nature, that we cannot “see” it directly because of more accurate intepretations like Habermas's. 

Now one question might be: what is “awareness?” It is a given that is apparent even before the “I,” and this seems to go all the way down, even to physical particles (atoms) that are “aware” of their external environments, at least in that they “respond” to them. Whatever it is it certainly seems to be inherent in the very nature of “form.” But is there a true “interiority” without a sense of “I?” Is “awareness” also “consciousness?” Even Whitehead doesn't make this conflation. He attributes this primordial awareness to causal efficacy, which even inanimate “actual entities” possess. Consciousness per se, for Whitehead, doesn't emege until “higher integrations in the fourth phase of concrescence.”*

I guess one of the things I'm trying to day is that it's easy to conflate “spirit” with “awareness” and “consciousness” but perhaps they are not the same. But what then?

* http://www.hyattcarter.com/glossary.htm

Balder : Kosmonaut
1 day later
Balder said

I agree that awareness is not the same as “mind” or “consciousness.”  Buddhists also make this distinction.  I'm also aware that Whiteheadian prehension is much simpler than the phenomenon we call “consciousness.”

What do you think of the nature and role of God in Whitehead's thought?

His perspective has some parallels to Wilber's and Bruteau's, it seems to me.

Wilber also says that it is impossible to avoid positing at least some metaphysical entities.  What do you think of this claim?

Best wishes,

B.

theurj : Wyrdo
1 day later
theurj said

I don't know much about Whitehead; I'm just now exploring him at Open Integral through the book Process and Difference referenced above. So not sure yet about him and God. So far it seems his notion of God though is quite different that the “usual,” given his non-foundational agenda. I'm also not sure about the necessity of metaphysical entities yet. I am now, as usual, “in process” on these matters.

Balder : Kosmonaut
1 day later
Balder said

Jiki,

I've been thinking about your comments about the possible UR and LR contributions to the emergence of communitarian nondualism.  From an AQAL perspective, we would expect to see transformations not only interiorly but exteriorly as well, with “feedback” flowing both ways.  So, what you're saying makes sense.  It's hard to gauge these things, though, and the feedback is probably quite complex – so I find it hard to predict where these changes in the LR are taking us. 

One thing I've been thinking about in my comments here is Wilber's claim that Kosmic grooves are still being laid down – which means that we still can't really say what will develop.  When I hear about “Kosmic grooves,” my initial reaction is one of passivity – as if I'm a spectator, watching a river wear away on the landscape.  But when I connect more deeply to my TSK practice, I realize that this undecidedness is also a creative opening.  We are actively involved in this – responding not only to the (indeterminate) “lineages of appearance” that give rise to the unfolding moment, but also contributing in some way to what lineages are lit up, and what may yet unfold.  It is this line of thinking that is behind my comments about the “usefulness” of visions like Bruteau's … seeing potential for certain patterns of unfolding within and through such a vision, even if we realize we are dealing, at some level, with a “myth”…

Best wishes,

B.

jikishin : composer
1 day later
jikishin said

scimming this thread of comment…  now I'm wondering if there is

an agency aspect to Zones 1, and 3, 
…a communal aspect to Zones 2 and 4,
…a communal aspect to Zones 5 and 7,
…and an agentic aspect to Zones 6 and 8  ?

Anyone else see this ?

jiki

theurj : Wyrdo
2 days later
theurj said

Re: Whitehead and the above you might find this interesting:
 

Mooney, Timothy (1999), “Deconstruction, Process and Openness: Philosophy in Derrida, Husserl and Whitehead” at http://www.ucd.ie/philosophy/staff/Mooney/decproopen.pdf


Whitehead calls the most primitive form of perception causal efficacy. It is the vague, ill-defined awareness of the wider environment and of our living bodies as its receptors which is involved in all seeing or hearing or touching. This level of awareness is responsible for our sense of continuity with nature and identification of our bodies with ourselves.


What we usually take as perception has the form of presentational immediacy. This is relatively clear and distinct, but only because it is an ‘active forgetting' which filters out most of the vagueness and complexity of causal efficacy. On Whitehead's account, the abstractive world of presentational immediacy has its origin in the inherited world of the immediate past, as mediated by the still more immediate past of antecedent bodily functioning.


Like Derrida, however, Whitehead notes that this immediacy does not amount to simple presence. For one thing, perception involves ‘symbolic reference' - whatever is presently experienced goes beyond itself, invoking a proximate future of anticipation as well as the proximate past. For another, it is invariably interpreted through a complex of ideas or conceptual scheme which of itself alone precludes our chancing upon a pure given. And we can no more have an adequate conception of a worldly thing than capture it in intuition. Our conceptions of worldly objects are inadequate, he argues, in that they lead us to concentrate on some of their characteristics whilst passing over others, and in that novel experiences hold out the possibility of modifying these very concepts (which informed previous perceptual acts).


Whitehead understands consciousness as a complex outgrowth of more basic, embodied experiences - it presupposes such experiences and not the other way round. By the same token he avoids the term ‘mind', which he regards as carrying unfortunate connotations of independence.  On his account, moreover, self-presence is given no primordiality - we do not initiate thought by an effort of self-consciousness - it is rather the case that ‘[w]e find ourselves thinking, just as we find ourselves breathing and enjoying the sunset'. So far as I know, Whitehead has no worked-out doctrine of reflexive and pre-reflexive self-acquaintance (though the latter could easily be read into the notion that we feel ourselves in causal efficacy). When he considers consciousness in general, however, he rules out any possibility of undifferentiated awareness:


Much of the above, despite its naturalistic reference to measurable time, is in accord with Derrida's description of self-presence. Further agreement is found in Whitehead's claim that there ‘is no definite area of human consciousness, within which there is clear discrimination and beyond which mere darkness'. Whitehead might not fully concur with Derrida's argument that the admission of the other into the present moment is the admission of nonevidence as well as nonpresence, but he certainly anticipates the latter in denying any privileged zone of transparency in consciousness.

Balder : Kosmonaut
2 days later
Balder said

Edward, this appears to be in contrast to Wilber's claim that there is at least one “perception without a perspective” – e.g., an unmediated and self-reflexive awareness – namely, Satori.

Jiki, your suggestion is interesting.  Can you tell me in what way you see a “communal” aspect in Zones 2 and 5?

theurj : Wyrdo
2 days later
theurj said

Indeed it does Bruce. However I think Whitehead does make an exception for “God,” which might be his version of satori. I'm pretty sure that Derrida though does not make this exception, nor does Habermas. And this is where I find the metaphysical loophole in Ken's otherwise postmetaphysical project.

Regarding the “agency” or “subjectivity” aspects of zones, I'll provide another quote below from the Mooney article. It seems Whitehead allows for “subjectivity” via prehension, although it's certainly not mind, consciousness or even sensation proper. (Nor satori, for that matter.)
 

The relations which enable an actual entity to develop are called ‘prehensions', a

neologism used by Whitehead to convey his claim that they are found at all levels of reality and need not involve consciousness or life.48 Prehensions are the various ways in which actual entities register data from their fellows in other times and places. This can involve the inclusion of a datum, which is the  preserve of a ‘positive prehension' or ‘feeling'. It can also involve a specific act of exclusion or ‘negative prehension'. Even here a minimal relation is established between two entities, since a datum must be encountered in some way in order to be excluded. According to Whitehead:


“Each actual entity is analysable in an indefinite number of ways. In some modes of analysis the component elements are more abstract than in other modes of analysis. The analysis of an actual entity into ‘prehensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete elements in the nature of actual entities….. …..any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any one actual entity:

it might have had more relevance; and it might have had less relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in the negative prehension; but in fact it has just that relevance whereby it finds its status in the constitution of that actual entity.”


Actual entities might never absorb other entities in their entirety, but their prehensions are nonetheless internal relations that hold within as well as between them.50 There are similarities discernible here between the network of prehensions constituting each thing and the structure of différance, and in Derridean fashion Whitehead does not regard a prehension as a simple operation of productive spontaneity or passive receptivity - the character or ‘subjective form' peculiar to each prehension is a product not just of the prehending subject but also of those determinations in the object prehended.51


Every actual entity enjoys subjectivity in that it prehensively emerges from a

background world and possesses a unique perspective on that world.52 Now within the confines of this essay I cannot give an account of the differences between the more basic actual entities and the complex ‘societies' of such entities which compose animals and humans.53 But what is found throughout Whitehead's work, as already intimated, is a rejection of soul-substantialism - subjectivity is an ongoing process of becoming in which no being can lie underneath or endure apart from its experiences or thoughts.54 When he turns to the topics of sense-perception and consciousness, he makes it clear that these are derivative operations precluding simple presence.

theurj : Wyrdo
2 days later
theurj said

And for an alternative view of  “no view” see this thread at OI:

From Postmetaphysical Thinking 4 at http://www.openintegral.net/blog/?p=107


Recall from Braitsten above that both Nagarjuna and Derrida emphasize that emptiness is beyond views or perspectives and is itself not a view or perspective. But neither is it a “consciousness” without a perspective or a “pure perception” as Ken defines it. Hence the former places perspectives in an indeterminate context whereas the latter has a determinate and absolute consciousness at its root, a la vedanta, vajrayana and yogacara. There is a big difference here (or is that differance?) with practical implications and consequences.

jikishin : composer
2 days later
jikishin said

Hi Balder,


“Can [I] tell [you] in what way [I] see a 'communal' aspect in Zones 2 and 5?”

In saying “aspect” of a Zone, I was thinking in terms of a Zone's center of gravity, or primary focus, not that Zones operate through any mode exclusivly.

(My notion of aspects began when reflecting on the partiality of the statement  ” Not through introspection but through history do we come to know ourselves.”)


Zone 5: Behavioral Interiority. To have a body is to have a history. To have a history is to embody, to incarnate, specific relatedness to entities. To embody relatedness is communal.
If Zone 5 enfolds the personal involutionary inheritance of the exterior, I would say that this content is, to whatever degree, available to the exterior agency (Zone 6) of the person.

For Zone 2 being seen as communal I would apply the same criteria of relatedness. That 1p X 2p = communal. Prior to structure, prior to self/other relation, communal aspects remain potential. Introspection itself I'd call an agency, or requiring agentic intentionality, but it's hardly communal until a knock is answered. Zone 2 is a zone of answered knocks (be it the knocks of the cosmos, or person-community). The exterior of the interior of the individual, I'm seeing as meeting place of entity and context. Even prior to intersubjectivity, the space that holds the valence of 1st person, the beginning of the communal, and the first field of manifestation of agency. I know I'm supposing a syntax of flow, but that's how I think of it now.

Writing this, it occurs to me to ask if an agency of one Zone may be an instrument of communion in another Zone.

Thanks for the grist and the prompt,

jiki

theurj : Wyrdo
3 days later
theurj said

Some of Wilber's comments on the topic of intersubjectivity (IS), Whitehead and nondualism follow. As you can see he is adamant about the “absolute” variety of IS as espoused by the “nondual tradition.” You can also see that he characterization of this direct, immediate perception of “it” arises in “consciousness” and “presence.” Whereas I argue (as do many others) that this is not at all what Nagarjuna's version of nonduality looks like or says, and that Derrida is on to the same idea. As is Whitehead in his “non-foundational” aspect.

Granted this is older material, but much of it is reiterated in Integral Spirituality, especially Ken's “dual” nonduality.
 

Ken in Appendix A of “Do critics misrepresent my position?” at http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/misc/critics_04.cfm/


… we needed to supplement immediate empirical knowing (or even immediate conceptual knowing) with interpretive, dialogical, paradoxical, ambiguous, intersubjective awareness, an intersubjectivity that is not just a result of the interaction between a prehending subject and other prehending subjects, but rather forms the priorly existing space or field in which both subject and object arise, after which, the subject then prehends the object in Whiteheadian process terms.


And ultimately, that intersubjectivity itself can exist–that is, subjects can participate in each other's immediate presence–because the agency of each subject opens directly onto nondual Spirit or pure Emptiness, so that, as I often put it, the agency of each holon acts as an opening or clearing in which other holons can manifest to each other, and that opening or clearing itself is (in part) a product of the four quadrants, so that a holon's culture (LL quadrant) is always already an intrinsic part of the holon's prehension of any objects.


Thus, even in Whitehead's notions of concrescence and prehensive unification, I do not detect a vivid understanding of strong intersubjectivity. Rather, using a merely Whiteheadian process philosophy, one must construct intersubjectivity (and true dialogical experience) from a repeated application of prehensive unifications and concrescences, all of which are to some degree after the fact. I believe this hampers Whiteheadian process philosophy from becoming a truly integral philosophy. By adopting a quadratic, instead of limited dialogical, approach, I am not denying Whitehead but enriching him.


(Note also that because Whitehead does not write about the nondual wave of awareness, his writing does not have a solution to aspect #3b of the mind-body problem, either; and thus, once again, by moving to an AQAL formulation this final aspect of the mind-body problem can likewise be solved. I am aware of no other approach that offers plausible solutions to all four aspects of the mind-body problem.)


There is, finally, the “ultimate” meaning of the mind-body problem (#3b) and its relation to “ultimate intersubjectivity.” I maintain that any sort of genuine and immediate intersubjectivity can only be derived from nondual consciousness or nondual Spirit. The reason is that, in the relative or manifest dimension, there is no simultaneous subject-to-subject presence, as Whitehead clearly explained. Whitehead pointed out that any actual occasion can only prehend its descendents, not its contemporaries. The reason is that every form of communication from one subject to another must enter the stream of time and travel to the other subject; by the time it reaches the other subject, the immediate present is gone, and thus the other subject prehends only the past (perception and memory being essentially synonymous). Thus, for Whitehead, there is no simultaneous Presence for any two subjects.


This is where the nondual traditions have much to offer. For these traditions, simultaneous subject-to-subject presence is possible because ultimately there is only one Subject (Atman, Buddhamind, Godhead). This means that each subject in the relative, manifest dimension, although prevented from having simultaneous presence in the relative realm (for precisely the reasons outlined by Whitehead), nonetheless possesses an immediate subject-to-subject simultaneous Presence in the ultimate or nondual dimension. Because there is ultimately only one Subject, then genuine intersubjectivity on the relative plane has an ultimate grounding. The reason is exactly as Erwin Schroedinger, cofounder of quantum mechanics, put it: “Consciousness is a singular of which the plural is unknown.” Because there is only one “nondual Mind,” then all relative minds can possess immediate “touching” or simultaneous Presence, something that Whitehead's view cannot explain or even allow.

jikishin : composer
3 days later
jikishin said

Thanks Edward,

That is very helpful.
Im no longer likely to write, “..even prior to intersubjectivity”, again.
What you've added is precisely relevant to my current concerns.

jiki

Balder : Kosmonaut
3 days later
Balder said

Hi, Edward, this is an old debate, as I'm sure you know.  I think Wilber's language is problematic, even for the traditions he is attempting to draw on (say, Vajrayana).  Vajrayana does not accept the idea that there is a monolithic Mind, for instance.  Though it's a subtle argument.  The criticism that traditions like Dzogchen have of Madhyamaka is that they see it as incomplete, and verging on nihilism.  They also see emptiness in Madhyamaka as primarily an intellectual realization – a mental exercise in deconstruction.  Dzogchen agrees that things are empty and lack inherent self-existence, but argues that emptiness-only is an incomplete view…positing instead the union of emptiness and clarity.  While clarity is a term for awareness, it also points to the fact that although phenomena are empty and foundationless, they nevertheless manifest unimepedly and uninterruptedly out of sheer openness or “space.” 

Here, space is not “physical” space; it is not extension, or even “container.”  The TSK tradition sometimes describes it simply as “allowingness,” and it seems to me that this may have some similarities to the Khora in Derrida's thought (or the “basho” in Kitaro Nishida's thought).   I'm going to have to investigate that more….

theurj : Wyrdo
3 days later
theurj said

Balder,

You’re right that it’s an old argument but what’s new about it is the intersubjective revolution. As Ken criticized in IS, these Buddhists (or any of the perennial tradition, as welll as modern phenomenologists), while using community validation, didn’t have the insights of pomo “about” intersubjectivity and hence made some serious assumptions without awareness of their cultural context. And without that insight they didn’t recognize that the very nature of the “I” arises from the process of socialization, from the outside, per Habermas and Mead. The source of the mysterious “witness” is not ultimate Spirit but natural, developmental self-reflexivity in relation to an other. That really does change everything.

Jiki,

Could you articulate how the material I provided was relevant to your questions about the zones?

Balder : Kosmonaut
3 days later
Balder said

As I see it, the Buddhists didn't grasp the socialization dynamics of Habermas and Mead, but they did realize that the I is a contingent and emergent entity – that it is not an eternal, changeless “given.”

jikishin : composer
3 days later
jikishin said

Edward,

You gave a needed lead regarding the play of noduality and agency, and reminded me not to omit the cultural intersubjective even while refering to upper quadrants.

(KW)…” the agency of each subject opens onto nondual Spirit or pure Emptiness, so that, the agency of each holon acts as an opening or clearing in which other holons can manifest to each other, and that opening or clearing itself is (in part) a product of the four quadrants…”

Just begining to see how what came all-at-once (re: a/c dynamics in zones) might relate to Nondual Community, I hadn't noticed the role of the nondual yet, but only saught the relative contours of what might apply to both this blog, and my fledgling grasp of(or grasping at) the actual topics.

You mentioned Whitehead's(via KW), ” In the relative, or manifest dimension, no simultaneous subject-to-subject presence…”

which was a point I made earlier among the comments on Balder's series here. One that I arrived at, independent of Whitehead, directly, through state training some twenty years ago. Although the context of the insight, in my case, was a Zen monastery, I don't know that that's a common Mahayana understanding. I did not find an agreeing consesus in the resident sangha. 

So the relevance of what you provided, Edward, was both by way of correction and affirmation.

Thanks again,

jiki

Balder : Kosmonaut
4 days later
Balder said

Edward and Jiki, have you read Alan Wallace's essay on intersubjectivity in Tibetan Buddhism?  I think it's relevant to this discussion, if you haven't.

Intersubjectivity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism

Best wishes,

B.

Bjorn : One Mind
4 days later
Bjorn said

Hi Balder,
Have you guys read Andrew Cohen's latest blog on his website? I have been longing for this intersubjectivity to come alive between people that are willing to push towards a unified living experience. One that many of us has tasted and seen through our “awakenings”, by ourselves or together with others. Acceptance and love will take down barriers but to reach beyond needs, I believe, commited participation. In Christianity there is a communial experience of the Holy Spirit through each and every ones living faith in Jesus, but more often than not, it is not pursued and pushed into the forfront of our everyday lives. We experience a communion that is bigger than all of us but then “go back” to our personal experience.
If we have tasted our fundamental non-difference, our true common ground, then I would love to live as that with others. But because it's not a steady occurance in our society we are actually pushing evolution into a new level of union between us. Love has always been the binding faculty among humans to come together and to resolve our differences. Now is the time when love has to become a living realm in which we exist. live and breath.
Andrew is pushing for this to happen and his students are describing the unfolding of it as they give their lives to participate in this. I believe this helps us to sort our our understanding in regards to something that is very very rare and help us move into such a communion among people who we share our lives with.

Understanding is essential as otherwise it will be left as a feeling experience. Understanding that it is an already potential union between us and for us to “experience” that together in a joint seeing, we need to align our efforts to realize what stands in our way, our own idea of separation.

The beautiful thing with the Holy Spirit in Christianity is that it bypasses the mind and its intellectual understanding and speaks directly to the heart of the “believers” and we feel communion in our bones and marrow, together with others. It caters to all alike. No need to be hyper smart in order to taste its liberating effect on the individual. Bringing us out of a personal hell into a larger communal awareness that is more true to our fundamental make up. Now, to incorporate our mind and understanding is essential in order to take it further but to share this common ground all we need to begin with is a surrendered heart.

To share in our inherent Oneness we need to accept that that is our very true nature.

Best regards,
Bjorn

theurj : Wyrdo
4 days later
theurj said

Thanks for the link and article Balder. I just read the intro and first section, which supposedly refutes the notion of the social creation of the self because via meditative quiescence we arrive at “a 'ground of becoming' from which all active mental processes arise.” Ken and others critique this because of the lack of awareness in traditional Buddhism of the psychodynamic development of the personal ego. It seems Wallace (and his Buddhists) take for granted certain foundational personal developments that are required in order to even begin to practice meditative quiescence. Do you think that a 2-year old, for example, could take up this practice (in any culture)? A 6-year old? At what age generally do you think this practice is relevant and why not before then? If not before then it this “ground of becoming” inherent or cultivated?

Balder : Kosmonaut
4 days later
Balder said

I think you should read the whole thing!  Alan Wallace works with Ken at the Integral Spiritual Center and he's aware of Ken's critiques.  I don't think he's brushing them aside, nor is he denying the contingency and developmental emergence of the self.


I do not think two-year-olds can meaningfully engage in the Buddhist practices he describes.  But this doesn't mean that what is observed is totally in one's head, or that whatever is seen is the product of cultivation.  Yes, the notion of a “ground of becoming” can only emerge after significant development, and it is, in an important sense, a construct.  But the question remains, can you – with the requisite developmentally emergent tools and perspectives – then begin to observe processes and dynamics and characteristics of one's experience that are not, themselves, simply “products” of that social conditioning?  If not – if what you see is only the product of social conditioning and has no validity outside of that sphere – then, of course, postmodernism would have nothing valid to say about anything other than itself.

Best wishes,

B.

Bjorn : One Mind
4 days later
Bjorn said

Oh, invincible or just ignored? Hmmm…


Well I'll just let you guys get on with it.


Cheers,

Balder : Kosmonaut
4 days later
Balder said

I guess the open question (for me) is whether the insights of traditions like Dzogchen (which purport to incorporate but point past the “mere emptiness” of Madhyamaka) are to be considered pre- or post-postmodern, in terms of the understanding of primordial awareness.  In other words, is Dzogchen's “nature of mind” a naive construct dreamed up by individuals who were ignorant of the constructed nature of subjective consciousness, or is it an insight born on the far side of the apprehension of (some version of) contextualism and constructivism?  Clearly, certain postmodern insights were not available to these ancient Buddhists; certain “gaps” are there.  And yet, it also seems to me that these practitioners do exhibit a sophisticated grasp of the “emptiness” and constructedness of subjectivity, self, and related categories such as “mind”…

Here's a passage from Wallace's essay that is relevant:

“The core of the Dzogchen practice of investigating the nature of the mind is stated

succinctly by Padmasambhava, who took an instrumental role in introducing this

practice in Tibet in the eighth century:


'While steadily maintaining the gaze, place the awareness unwaveringly, steadily, clearly,

nakedly and fixedly without having anything on which to meditate in the sphere of space.

When stability increases, examine the consciousness that is stable. Then gently release

and relax. Again place it steadily and steadfastly observe the consciousness of that

moment. What is the nature of that mind? Let it steadfastly observe itself. Is it something

clear and steady or is it an emptiness that is nothing? Is there something there to recognize?


Look again and report your experience to me!' (Padmasambhava, 1998, p. 116)


By means of such inquiry, generations of Buddhist contemplatives have come to the

conclusion that the mind and awareness itself are not intrinsically identifiable. When

sought out as inherently existing things or events, they are not to be found. This is

equally true of all other perceptual and conceptual objects of awareness. The mind,

like all other phenomena, is discovered to be empty, but it is not a mere vacuity.

Rather, it is luminous, cognizant and empty, like boundless space, with no centre or

periphery, suffused with transparent light. Out of this luminous space of non-local

awareness all phenomena arise in relation to the conceptual frameworks within which

they are designated. But neither the objects of awareness nor awareness itself can be

said to exist independently of their conceptual designations. Recognition of this fundamental nature of the world of experience yields a dream-like quality to life as a

whole, in which all reified distinctions between subject and object, self and other,

have vanished.


Once one has recognized the lack of inherent existence of the mind and all mental

objects, one is ready to be introduced to the primordial nature of awareness that transcends all conceptual constructs, including the notions of existence and non-existence.


This is the central theme of Dzogchen practice and is considered the deepest of all

insights. Padmasambhava points out the fundamental nature of awareness as follows:


'To introduce this by pointing it out directly, past consciousness has disappeared without a trace. Moreover, future realization is unarisen, and in the freshness of its own present,

unfabricated way of being, there is the ordinary consciousness of the present. When it

peers into itself, with this observation there is a vividness in which nothing is seen. This

awareness is direct, naked, vivid, unestablished, empty, limpid luminosity, unique,

non-dual clarity and emptiness. It is not permanent, but unestablished. It is not nihilistic,

but radiantly vivid. It is not one, but is manifoldly aware and clear. It is not manifold, but

is indivisibly of one taste. It is none other than this very self-awareness. This is an authentic introduction to the primordial nature of being.' (Padmasambhava, 1998, p. 108)


In this intimate exchange between contemplative mentor and student, the mentor ideally

speaks directly out of his or her immediate experience of pure awareness, and by

receiving this introduction the student's own pure awareness is aroused and identified

firsthand. Unlike conventional modes of cognition, here that which is apprehended

and that which apprehends are identical. Such a mentor-student encounter is a paradigmatic ‘I-thou' relationship, in which both realize a non-local reality that transcends

the individuation of both subjects. But the realization of the primordial nature

of awareness can also occur without engaging with another person. It does not arise

from the interaction of two subjects, but rather transcends the distinctions among all

subjects and objects.”

Balder : Kosmonaut
4 days later
Balder said

Neither, Bjorn!  The day is still young (for me - it's morning now) and I've been planning to respond to your post as well.  Your post is actually more on topic than the discussion we've been having…

Just give me a little more time to digest and respond to what you've said!

(Concerning your question about Cohen's latest blog, I haven't read it yet, but I did cite an earlier blog entry of his on “collective awakening” in one of my previous blogs in this series.)

Best wishes,

B.

Bjorn : One Mind
4 days later
Bjorn said

Hear hear
Om mani padme hum

Now that taken to be realized among many, together, at the same time, brings about wonderous communion.

theurj : Wyrdo
4 days later
theurj said

Perhaps you (plural) can help me understand something(s). I think this inquiry is relevant to the thread “nondual community” because 1) we are trying to understand these nondual issues communally; 2) part of the issue of primordial awareness might hinge on its communal development; and 3) the very idea of nondual community might just be a “postmodern” development in nonduality, per Cohen.

If we accept that Ken no longer puts the states (subtle, causal and nondual) above the stages in development because they are not higher stages, and his claim that those states (including the nondual) are interpreted by the stages, and that there are indeed higher stages than turquoise (3rd-tier), then I have a few questions.

It appears Ken says in IS that the traditional Buddhist interpretation of the states is not yet from at least the green stage, let alone teal or turquoise. (But in another place he contradicts this saying some Buddhist doctrines are indigo stage. I don't have time to refeence both of the above but might later.) So if the “usual” Buddhist interpretations of the “primordial awareness” are not only pre-3rd tier but even pre-2nd tier stage, then what would a turquoise or indigo interpretation of these states look like? And who is qualified to provide them? We don't have such interpretations in IS that I can find. 

theurj : Wyrdo
4 days later
theurj said

The following excerpts are from the draft of Integral Spirituality. The pagination is different from the printed book, but having perused the book I can tell you that most of the draft survives in the book verbatim.

From IS:

A second problem quickly compounded that one. If “enlightenment” (or any sort of unio

mystica) really meant going through all of those 8 stages, then how could somebody 2000 years ago be enlightened, since some of the stages, like systemic GlobalView, are recent emergents? (107)


It allowed us to see how individuals at even some of the lower stages of development-such as magic or mythic-could still have profound religious, spiritual, and meditative state experiences. Thus, gross/psychic, subtle, causal, and nondual were no longer stages stacked on top of the Western conventional stages, but were states (including altered states and peak experiences) that can and did occur alongside any of those stages. (110)


(What was so doubly confusing to us is the fact that, as indicated on fig. 6, there are also

3 or 4 higher structures beyond the centaur, and they have similar-sounding characteristics as these 3 or 4 higher states, which made it almost impossible to spot the differences. (110)


Anybody familiar with the monastic traditions, East and West, from Zen to Benedictine, will recognize those souls who might be quite spiritually advanced in Underhill's sense (very advanced in contemplative illumination and unification) and yet might still have a very conformist and conventional mentality-sometimes shockingly xenophobic and ethnocentric-and this goes, unfortunately, for many Tibetan and Japanese meditation masters. Although they are very advanced in meditative states training, their structures are amber-to-orange, and thus their available interpretive repertoire is loaded by the Lower-Left quadrant with very ethnocentric and parochial ideas that pass for timeless Buddhadharma. (E.g., according to his secretary, the Dalai Lama believes homosexuality is a sin, anal sex is a sin, oral sex is bad karma, etc.-when everybody knows that oral sex is not bad karma, only bad oral sex is bad karma…. But these sadly are typical mythic-amber beliefs.) (117-18)


In the meantime, Asian meditation teachers, with a LL-quadrant that is heavily amber, or mythic-membership, and hence “non-egoic” in the sense of PREinvidualistic, and therefore used to having students simply obey them unhesitatingly and in a conformist-stage fashion, don't quite know what to do with individualistic-stage Westerners, whose LL-quadrant is loaded orange-to-green. (118)


…many of the great contemplative texts, sutras, and tantras were written in the cognitive line from at least the turquoise and often indigo or violet levels. (127)

Balder : Kosmonaut
4 days later
Balder said

Thanks for those quotes, Edward.  I'm familiar with them – and I've also asked, on Integral forums, about just how this “breaks down”…what aspects of Buddhism Wilber sees as turquoise or higher, as opposed to those teachings which are clearly more mythological or at least “first tier.”  I have not gotten a clear answer, and I'm not sure Ken has given one (in print). 

I did ask Hokai, another member of Zaadz and the Multiplex, if he would care to comment here on my blog, since he has just returned from a conference on “Integral Mahamudra” and I expect he may have a clearer idea about Ken's ideas in this area.  I haven't heard back from him yet, and I don't really know if he does have a clearer idea, but we'll see…

About the relevance of our discussion to this blog entry, I agree that Derrida's and Habermas' analyses have significant bearing on this whole topic of intersubjectivity and awakening.  What I meant was, this particular blog entry was based on a Christian-influenced model of intersubjectivity, and we've only been discussing Buddhism and postmodernism.


Bjorn,


Thanks for the heads up about Cohen's latest blog entry.  I am aware of earlier comments he's made on “collective awakening” in the context of evolutionary enlightenment and postmetaphysics.  I will read his blog entry this weekend.  If you care to write anything on your blog about his ideas, I'll link to your blog from mine.


I find the Christian notions of kenotic agape and perichoresis to be very interesting, and useful, “angles” on ideas that others also address, in different (less love-centered) terms.  For instance, Derrida talks about how the subject empties itself into the object, which mirrors but has a different flavor (and really, context) than kenosis.  But exploring the mirroring can be useful. 

I want to give more time to this; I'll come back to these ideas later…

Best wishes,

Balder

theurj : Wyrdo
5 days later
theurj said

As my inquiry is getting to be a bit broader than the intent of this blog entry, I've posted it under “Indigo Buddhism” in the I-I Zaadz site, as well as Open Integral and Lightmind Forum. Please visit there for further discussion, thanks.

Balder : Kosmonaut
5 days later
Balder said

Thanks, Edward, I saw that, and I just posted a longish response there.

Best wishes,

B.

Hokai : In Absentia
11 days later
Hokai said

Hi Bruce,
I wish I had more time but these days it's impossible for me to devote these issues the time they deserve, and write down at least an attempt at serious analysis.

As you mention elsewhere, the WCLattice or Matrix may or may not be sufficient, but that's not the point, I believe. What it does, however, is amazing. The same goes for KW's “ladder” or vertical fulcrums of growth and transformation. It's important to limit any model to what it does, or at least what it strives to achieve. The WCL, specifically, aims to delineate structure-stages and state-stages, and that results in a matrix of at least a dozen probable realization-complexes. I say “complexes”, because these may become deeply problematic if the distinction between structure and stage stabilization is not understood correctly. Of course, the lattice will not “explain” various issues, since it only demonstrates the basic distinction. Some issues only become available once we accept the basic proposition of the WCL.

As to Integral Buddhism (or specifically, Integral Mahamudra, Integral Zen, Integral you-name-it), at this point it's just a whisper, and for some of us a promise, a challenge…  Patrick Sweeney holds that the issue of hierarchy presents such a challenge. When people gather to practice, they organize a mandala of transformation, wherein the mandala of confusion is realized to be the mandala of awakening. In order to
effectively deliver such a transformation, the teacher aided by students must establish a hierarchy of principles and representations to serve as an external transformational setting, itself an enactment of an inner transformative potential. The “guru” is brought into the post-metaphysical context along with the principles of purification, transformation and spontaneous awakening.

It's seems obvious what Ken Wilber proposes from his book “Integral Spirituality”, but the details should be developed by lineage-holders and senior practitioners in each lineage, who are at home both in the integral view and practice, as well as the esoteric core of their respective traditions.

Are there specific issues you had in mind?

Hokai

Balder : Kosmonaut
11 days later
Balder said

Thanks, Hokai.  I am also interested in the potential of the W/C lattice, and I agree that it looks promising for introducing a very helpful granularity of perspective, but I still have questions about some aspects of it.  It's a matter for further study, on my part…. 


One of the issues I wanted to ask for your input on was Theurj's contention that traditions such as Dzogchen misunderstand emptiness, and that teachings on “nature of mind” and such are outmoded and metaphysical.  Theurj has argued that early Buddhist teachers lacked the intersubjective developmental perspective which would have allowed them to see that the “nature of mind”/”buddhanature” to which Mahayana and Vajrayana teachings point are developmentally emergent phenomena - dependent on transcending and including socially constructed subject-object distinctions - rather than being “primordial” or “unborn.”  On the Indigo Buddhism thread, I attempted a response to this criticism.  I can direct you to it, if you haven't seen it.  But I was interested in your thoughts as well.


About bringing the “guru” in in a postmetaphysical context, I think that's an interesting way to look at things.  I am reminded of the Tibetan convention of conceiving of the unfolding of gestalts of experience in terms of guru-student-and-occasion: that there is a complex layering of unfolding experience with an in-built, self-transcending, transformative dynamic at work.  Herbert Guenther discusses this in “Matrix of Mystery,” if I recall correctly…


Best wishes,


Balder

Hokai : In Absentia
11 days later
Hokai said

Hey, Bruce. From what I've seen at the “indigo” thread (I wonder who came up with that title, sure of themselves when it comes to something like “indigo”), Theurj uses altitudes as if they were one thing, such as in the following statement, “assuming that Nagarjuna and Padmasambhava and even the current Dalai Lama are not indigo level, then we must take their interpretations of their state experiences as the interpretations of a lower level”. Let's counter this misconception by using just integral concepts. You can never really say someone is or isn't any level, because (1) there are levels and lines, and (2) because there is frontal structure, deeper psyche and witness, which make the distribution of identity a complex issue, and (3) because the COG itself, even if we locate it accurately, may oscilate depending on a variety of conditions. There are huge differences among great Buddhist masters of old in terms of being conservative or progressive, public and private statements etc., and so it is today. Further, speaking of “rationality” as some single entity is also quite mistaken. What “rationality” arose in India and Greece (that was an elite philosophical discipline), has not much to do with what “rationality” we have today (this is a mainstream worldview that excludes transrational methodologies) etc. etc.

Now to emtpiness and everything :-) As far understanding emptiness is concerned, every school of buddhadharma understands it a little differently, but the core insight is always there, i.e. nonexistence of an absolute reference, that is, a radically open clarity endowed with spontaneous responsiveness. Even for the historical Buddha,

    “Bhikkhus, this mind is luminous, but an uneducated ordinary person does not know that it is luminous and this luminous mind can become impure, defiled by adventitious defilements.”

Sectarian rivalry and endless doctrinal disputes should not confuse us. As to Tibetan Buddhism, Shentong reconciled the different streams long ago. Yes, most teachings on the nature of mind are outdated in their style of presentation and their mode of argumentation. But that doesn't make them “wrong”, just dusty. Primordial and unborn are still beautiful words, but obviously not for everyone. There used to be a time when not everyone would even know such teachings exist. And not everyone could comment on whether it's outdated. First you receive the teachings, then you study the teachings, then you practice and realize the teachings, and then you may comment the teachings. It's still true, and not outdated. As to the buddhanature being “emergent” and dependent on socially constructed subject-object distinctions… well, buddhanature has at least two distinct aspects - one absolute, one relative. One primordial, one developmental. And both are ascertained directly.  However, even when we discuss the relative part (assuming we have some direct experience), what is discussed in the tradition may be in rather different altitudes, but always indicating a progression in state-stages, not an explicit (or even a recognized) progression in structure-stages (structures where not known then in traditions, but are known today in these same traditions. i.e. what we call “traditions” as historical accumulations, should be known as “lineages”, and they are carried on as they continue to evolve even as we speak). So the socially constructed relations are left as found, not engaged - this is, of course, a contemplative path to awakening, not an armchair discussion. What that means for someone's understanding of emptiness, is quite beyond me, since that would depend on how one utilizes the methodology.

I agree there are many dull-witted, unimaginative, uninventive presentations of dharma, and I'm not talking of old documents, but of contemporary expositions, current and normative today in the West. That betrays a problem, not what Tsongkhapa or Dogen wrote and what that really means.

As to the guru, you know this I'm sure but I'll spell it anyway. There is the guru as master, and there's the inner guide. The deity may signify both simultaneously. It is a challenge, but a wonderful one, to bring the guru yoga practice into the present culture in a creative manner, truly integrating timeless wisdom and post/modern knowledge. In this we cannot rely on ancient handbooks. We need to dissolve the guru institution in order to reform the guru yoga and deity yoga itself, and that can only be done by authentic teachers leading the way. Frankly, it's a long and painful process and many people in positions of authority are not helping.

Having individual mystics with fresh formulations is one thing. Reforming institutions and the way the teachings of a lineage are practiced and apllied en masse is something entirely different.

Hokai

16 days later
C A M E L O T said

Apologies for interrupting this amazing discussion , but I just logged into Bruce's blogpost tonight, and I had to say that the post itself was luminous to me, transportive, ecstatic! Thank YOU so so much,  Bruce!

Ok, you guys go back to theorizing… ;P

Balder : Kosmonaut
18 days later
Balder said

Hi, Camelot (love your new avatar!),

I'm happy you enjoyed the blog post.  Bruteau's model is a metaphysical one, rather than a postmetaphysical one, but I believe it has its own value – and is quite beautiful and inspiring too.  In the metaphysical sphere, I think there are some amazing, wild new flowers blooming as Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist contemplatives and metaphysicians get together and talk…

Postmetaphysically, we may want to reframe or recontextualize the models they develop, but that is not to diminish what they are offering…

Best wishes,

B.

21 days later
C A M E L O T said

*paw* (which you can visualize as a checkered lion paw going up like a high five)

Bruce thank you for indulging my ignorance! ofcourse I missed that BB was representative of a metaphysical approach and not a post-metaphysical one. At what point is the “myth of the given” dangerous? I have heard Andrew Cohen talk about the “God principle” and isnt he “integral” and hence post-metaphysical? kw talks and writes about “Eros” which sounds alot like a euphemism for God as well doesnt he? I hope you will enlighten me :)

Love,
J

Ecumenicist : ecumenicist
2 months later
Ecumenicist said


I've always been a bit bothered by  worldviews in which “transcendent enlightenment” is considered a developmental goal or destination, because it implies that the developmental
disposition of one individual or tradition or culture may be considered superior to others.

This is why the ideas posited in this essay appeal to me.  In Bruteau's realization that transcendent “realization of oneness” leads to selfless service to others, one may see that through the connectedness, serving others is actually another manifestation of serving self.  After all, if I'm connected to the whole, and I seek transcendence, then my ability to transcend is tied to the transcendence of the whole, so it becomes important for me to
serve the whole so that I might achieve transcendence as part of the whole. 

This realization may lead to a sort of egalitarian humility, and understanding that in the context of the true infinity of transcendence, every member of the whole is at an equal level of development and enlightenment, whether servingt self overtly in a physical sense, or serving self in a subverted sense through the service of others. 

This differs a bit from Plato's idea of rising to the level of the gods, and then finding one's self back among the ignorant masses who only perceive shadows, to help them look beyond the shadows.  Rather than the Platonic model, this says that our aspirations  towards transcendence help us to humbly realize our connectedness, solidarity, and equality with the masses, the whole, and in this realization, we recognize a necessity to serve individuals within the whole.

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